At the end of November 1993, the peace agreement and the ceasefire were on very delicate footing when a massacre in Ruhengeri prefecture brought the RPF and the government into conflict, both of which refused to participate in the joint commission set up to integrate the military, thus further delaying demobilization efforts (doc. 19 and document 20). The Arusha Accords were a UNITED Nations-sponsored agreement between the RPF, a predominantly Tutsi rebel group, and the Rwandan government. This contribution will focus specifically on the section on military power-sharing (demobilization and reintegration) of the Arusha Agreement, which was a minor but decisive part of the broader political context in which the genocide took place. These documents highlight the inability of the international community to fully support Rwanda`s peace efforts, as well as the Rwandan government and the inability of the RPF to implement peace. This document describes the plans for a citizen security apparatus under a new government and two important points on demobilization. The Rwandan government wants the soldiers identified for demobilization to be separated from the rest of the troops and then “released for demobilization activity.” The RPF wants all troops to stay together until demobilization. In addition, the RPF wants remuneration for the families of deceased soldiers, but the Rwandan government opposes this because “it has no comparable system and could never verify RPF claims”. Ambassador Flaten writes that any mention of demobilization is causing an increase in violence on the streets of Rwanda. It reports an outbreak of violence in Ruhengeri, a town northeast of Kigali, due to Kinyarwanda Radio`s “insufficient coverage of government plans to demobilze the army.” The French-language channel reported that “the government was considering plans to retrain demobilized soldiers once the war was over,” but at Kinyarwanda station, “it simply emerged that the army had to be demobilized.” As part of the Arusha negotiations, the international community was called upon to provide a “neutral international force” to assist in the implementation of the peace agreements. This includes helping to facilitate the outrage, demobilization and reintegration programme and securing funding for the programme (documents 10 and 39). However, the international community has struggled to put in place the means, the Rwandans have never set up the transitional government and the demobilization programme has never been implemented (document 23).

This document provides an update on the negotiations in Arusha, including the integration and demobilization of armies, under discussion The shares of the armed forces, possible integration processes and the estimated number of troops to be demobilized. Ambassador Flaten writes: “Rwandans are ready to make a firm proposal for integration and have shown good reflection on the demobilization that followed.